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The Recruitment of Female 
“Mules” by Transnational 
Criminal Organizations 
Securitization of Drug Trafficking 
in the Philippines and Beyond1
Southeast Asia has long been vulnerable to drug trafficking. 
Recently, intensified flows of persons, goods, and capital across 
borders have rendered it more fragmented and complex. The 
recruitment of female drug “mules” by transnational criminal 
organizations is a growing concern for both national and 
international counter-trafficking authorities in the region. This 
phenomenon has been the focus of a particular securitization 
process, emerging primarily in the Philippines but having 
regional implications, which has supported the implementation 
of counter-trafficking policy initiatives on both levels of state 
and region in Southeast Asia.
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INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asia has long been vulnerable to drug tra!cking. Nowadays, 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating in the region 
are a growing concern for national authorities as well as international 
organizations. Intensi"ed #ows of persons, goods, and capital across 
borders, both licit and illicit, have rendered drug tra!cking more 
fragmented and complex, and thus harder to counter. Since the sudden 
surge of tra!cking in amphetamine-type stimulants in Southeast Asia 
during the 1990s, modes of operation characterizing the regional drug 
trade have considerably changed. One of the emerging patterns is the 
increasing use of women as drug “mules,” de"ned as “those who carry 
drugs bought by someone else across national borders” (Fleetwood and 
Haas 2011, 197). $is phenomenon has been the focus of a particular 
securitization process, emerging primarily in the Philippines, which 
has been a major hub for crystal methamphetamine tra!cking 
since the middle of the 1990s. O!cial statements focusing on the 
victimization of Filipino nationals, especially women, by TCOs have 
supported the implementation of counter-tra!cking policy initiatives. 
$is focus is part of a wider securitization process that is taking place in 
Southeast Asia at both levels of state and region, having implications 
for multilateralism in the "eld of security.
SECURITIZATION AS A CONTINUUM: 
INSIGHTS FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA
It has been generally acknowledged that since the end of the Cold 
War, the scope of security has broadened and deepened, and the 
range of phenomena considered has consequently been expanded to 
include a wider host of issues ( Jones 2011). A change in perceptions 
of (in)security has occurred, as the threat of a major nuclear con#ict 
between superpowers has been replaced by other threats (Bigo 2006). 
$ese are transnational in essence and include a wide range of issues, 
from pandemics and environmental disasters to piracy, terrorism, and 
organized crime. $e latest in particular has become a great concern. 
As Bigo (2006, 387) points out, “War between states [is] less plausible, 
but crime [is] evolving and threatening the state and the identity of 
societies.” In this context, critical approaches have emerged to challenge 
traditional security studies, of which the securitization framework 
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developed by the Copenhagen School has been particularly in!uential 
(Williams 2003, 511).
Securitization has been de"ned by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 
(1998) as an inter-subjective and socially constructed process, through 
which an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated 
“referent object,” requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure. Securitization 
typically works in two stages: 1) the enactment of a “securitizing 
move” targeting a speci"c “audience,” and 2) the audience’s approval 
of the countermeasures. In order to ensure successful securitization, 
“facilitating conditions”—i.e., particular features of the issue itself 
and its context—are put forward by the “securitizing actors” (ibid., 
23–25). Indeed, while security cannot be reduced to the existence 
of objective threats, empirical considerations provide resources upon 
which actors may draw in securitizing a given issue (Williams 2003, 
514). Such a discourse usually relies on a constructed dichotomy, in 
which the referent object—usually the state, the nation, and/or the 
people—are portrayed as “Self,” and the threat as “Other” (Hansen 
2006; Herschinger 2011).
#e securitization framework has been criticized for a number 
of reasons, notably because of its exclusive emphasis on discourse 
(McDonald 2008; Jones 2011; Williams 2003), as opposed to practice, 
and for its Eurocentrism (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers 2006; 
McDonald 2008). #e latter has led a growing number of scholars 
to recognize the fundamental importance of context in securitization 
(McDonald 2008; Balzacq 2005). Some have begun to extend its use 
to the analysis of non-Western contexts, both national and regional, 
and to adapt the framework in the light of these case studies. Because 
Southeast Asia has been increasingly recognized as hosting a particularly 
wide spectrum of security threats, it has attracted considerable attention 
in recent years (Emmers 2003; Caballero-Anthony and Emmers 
2006; Caballero-Anthony 2008; Tan 2006). Still, extended analysis on 
a speci"c issue, and its implications for the practice of international 
relations within regional arrangements other than the European Union 
especially, are notoriously rare ( Jones 2011; Haacke and Williams 2008). 
#is article’s main objective is to contribute to this growing literature 
by extending implications drawn from the Philippines’ case to its wider 
regional context, and to show that the securitization process taking 
place in the Philippines on drug tra$cking has regional rami"cations, 
which may facilitate the progress of multilateralism in Southeast Asia. 
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Following the path inaugurated by scholars such as Mely 
Caballero-Anthony (2008), Ralf Emmers (2003), Jürgen Haacke 
(Haacke and Williams 2008), Lee Jones (2011), and others, we !rst 
consider a number of elements that have to be taken into account before 
using the securitization framework for an analysis on drug tra"cking 
in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. We adopt the assumption 
made by several of the aforementioned authors according to whom 
securitization is best conceived as a continuum, instead of a sudden 
securitizing move, through which an issue is gradually shifted from 
being considered an apolitical problem to its successful securitization, 
both through the acceptance of the “securitizing move” by the audience 
and the following enactment of extraordinary measures (Haacke and 
Williams 2008, 809; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). 
#e paper will !rstly examine the facilitating conditions put 
forward by securitizing actors in order to ensure a successful account of 
drug tra"cking as a security threat in the Philippines. #e next section 
will focus more extensively on the securitizing move2 by national 
authorities—i.e., state o"cials, high representatives of national 
counter-tra"cking agencies, o"cials from custom services, the police, 
the army, etc.—which is oriented towards a certain aspect of the threat: 
the recruitment of female drug mules. #e third part of the paper will 
link this speci!c trend with a wider securitization process regarding 
drug tra"cking emerging throughout the region.3 By introducing 
inputs from the cases of #ailand, Indonesia, and, to a lesser extent, 
Malaysia, this section will demonstrate that these countries present 
similarities with the Philippines as to how they o"cially deal with 
the issue of drug tra"cking, and examine the potential impacts on 
interstate cooperation against security threats.
#e analysis of what is underway in the Philippines regarding 
the framing of drug tra"cking by national authorities reinforces the 
relevance of this view of securitization as a process. It does not imply 
that the process under scrutiny has to have already, or ever, lead to 
successful securitization, only that this framework is useful to think 
both about how the o"cial discourse is elaborated and how counter-
tra"cking policies are actually implemented. Also, readers will 
note that our research focuses much more on the !rst stage of the 
securitization process, i.e., the move by “securitizing actors.” While we 
also analyze counter-tra"cking measures implemented following the 
securitizing move, the receptivity of the audience, whether internal 
(political elites and other relevant actors in the decision-making 
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process) or external (public opinion), is not a primary concern here, 
mainly because of a need for concision, but also partially because of the 
lack of transparency in the decision-making process in the countries 
under study, in comparison to cases that traditionally constitute the 
bulk of the research issued by the Copenhagen School.
!e securitization process under scrutiny has been mainly translated 
through o"cial communication, both written and declaratory, issued by 
national governments and ASEAN, and consequent policy initiatives. 
!e media have played a signi#cant role in relying such statements 
and have actively contributed to shed light on the speci#c aspects 
of drug tra"cking in the Philippines and neighboring countries 
that have attracted o"cial concern. Extensive interviews were also 
conducted with representatives of national and international counter-
tra"cking agencies operating within Southeast Asia to improve our 
understanding of the speci#cs by which securitizing actors construct 
drug tra"cking as a security threat.4
FACILITATING CONDITIONS: 
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE PHILIPPINES
!e actual modalities of drug tra"cking in the Philippines, and 
the region in general, that were the subject of o"cial attention in 
recent years must #rst and foremost be brought to light in order to 
better understand the securitization process that is taking place 
simultaneously.
!e most widespread drug of use in the Philippines has been 
crystal-methamphetamine, since manufacture operations have been 
installed during the 1990s by the yakuza, who $ed crackdowns by the 
Japanese government (United Nations O"ce on Drugs and Crime 
[UNODC] 2011a, 113; Kaplan and Dubro 2003, 223–76). So-called 
“Ethnic-Chinese” gangs then allegedly took over control of the drug 
trade at the end of the 1990s. !ey were controlling drug exports from 
the Philippines, an easy destination for convoys carrying ephedrine, 
which is the main ingredient for the production of methamphetamine, 
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan to other 
countries in the region (Dupont 1999, 447; Lintner 2003, 3–5). 
Crystal-methamphetamine tra"cking thus continues to be the 
main target of counter-tra"cking operations in the Philippines and 
neighboring countries.
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While seizures culminated around 2008, a trend observed in most 
countries of the maritime sub-region of Southeast Asia, manufacture 
has been reported in the Philippines much earlier than in neighboring 
countries. !e Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA 2004) 
reports that its teams "rst discovered local manufacture facilities in 
1999. According to the UNODC, large-scale production dates back to 
2002. Between then and 2010, counter-tra#cking authorities declared 
having successfully dismantled 72 laboratories. 
!ere has been a shift from large-scale production to small-scale 
kitchen-type labs in recent years. In addition, signs of an increasing 
tendency to compartmentalize production, in di$erent steps and 
locations, show that the search for manufacture sites is becoming more 
di#cult for the authorities and allows corrupt agents to be more e#cient 
in preventing seizures by tipping o$ alleged tra#ckers. While there 
have been many press reports on the implication in drug tra#cking 
of local clans with extensive ties with the authorities, international 
counter-tra#cking agencies repeatedly state that primary organizers 
and "nancers remain “Ethnic-Chinese” transnational organized 
crime groups, at least for methamphetamine tra#cking (Bureau of 
 
Figure 1. Crystal-meth seizures (kg) in Southeast Asia, per country, per year (UNODC 
2011a). No data available for Laos and Vietnam.
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International Narcotics and Law Enforcement A!airs [BINLEA] 
2011 369; UNODC 2012, 117).
Other drugs such as heroin and cocaine are also present in 
considerable amounts in the Philippines. West African syndicates 
operating worldwide with rami"cations throughout the region are 
known to control such activities, and national reports indicate that 
they have been particularly prone to recruiting women as drug 
mules. O#cial declarations also show that they seem to be gradually 
shifting to crystal-methamphetamine tra#cking and that they rely 
increasingly on the Philippines as a hub for distribution in neighboring 
countries (BINLEA 2009; PDEA 2011; UNODC 2010, 2011a, 2012; 
Observatory on Illicit Tra#cking 2011). Cannabis is also reportedly 
produced in large amounts in the regions of Luzon and Mindanao 
(PDEA 2010; BINLEA 2011, 457).
$e use of human couriers to carry drugs is not limited to 
methamphetamine tra#cking. But it must be understood that the 
drastic increase in the recruitment of mules is concomitant to the 
growing transnational character of drug tra#cking in the region, an 
especially important feature of tra#cking in synthetic drugs. $e 
increasing number of Filipino nationals, especially overseas Filipino 
workers (OFWs), being arrested while carrying crystal-meth is a 
matter of great concern for national authorities (BINLEA 2011, 457). 
$e PDEA (2011, 13) stated that 678 Filipino nationals had been 
arrested in other countries in 2010, 89 of which being on death row at 
the time the report was issued. According to o#cial statements, these 
numbers point to a growing tendency among TCOs to rely on mules 
from manufacturing countries to ensure international transshipment 
of narcotics. $is phenomenon has been the main subject of the 
securitization process that is taking place in the Philippines. $e origin 
of this rise, according to the Philippine authorities, lies in the growing 
presence of West African Drug Syndicates (WADS) in the region, 
who typically rely on this mode of operation as it is well adapted to 
their predominant use of air transport.
$e use of drug mules, especially women, is systematically linked 
with the greater issue of transnational criminal networks by the 
authorities. But there are also a certain number of indicators showing 
that a wide number of local criminal organizations participating in 
drug tra#cking, among other activities, are operating inside the 
Philippines. $e PDEA acknowledged that through the ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) Fact Finding Committee, 
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which stated that 259 “local groups” were neutralized by national 
agencies’ operations in 2010 (AIPA 2012). However, o!cial reports 
indicate that the narcotics trade in the Philippines is embedded in 
transit routes crossing the entire region and controlled by regional 
players that facilitate the drug "ows within and out of the country, 
sometimes employing local clans mainly to control production sites 
and tra!cking within the country, while they assume the role of 
transnational brokers (Vellema et al. 2011, 303–4). Moreover, as local 
groups typically operate within national borders, the need to avoid 
suspicion is less systematic than when the crossing of borders through 
customs and checkpoints is involved. #e recruitment of locals by 
tra!ckers of foreign origin working for TCOs to carry drugs across 
borders is seen as an e$ective way to limit the proportion of seizures 
and arrests from national authorities, as racial pro%ling is common and 
o!cially acknowledged (Agence France-Presse [AFP] 2012).
#ese facilitating conditions lead the authorities to elaborate 
a discourse that focuses on speci%c aspects of the drug trade in the 
Philippines, which are coherent with a general tendency to describe the 
threat as external to the region, and to implement counter-tra!cking 
initiatives accordingly.
THE RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN AS DRUG MULES
#e recruitment of women through the Internet or personal contacts 
by transnational organizations is a growing concern. #e PDEA makes 
a point of repeatedly stating that out of the 678 drug couriers arrested 
in foreign countries during 2010, 425 were women. #is number still 
contrasts heavily with the national statistics showing that 84 percent 
of the inmates classi%ed as “drug personalities” in 2010 were men 
(PDEA 2011, 13), but the percentage of women convictions related to 
drug matters continues to rise in the region. O!cial reports assess that 
women are being wooed into relationships with foreign nationals who 
then exploit them as drug couriers with or without them knowingly 
carrying drugs. National authorities in the Philippines have thus 
been especially prompt in orienting the security discourse about drug 
tra!cking on the use of Filipinas as mules by TCOs and the necessity 
for the government to protect them.
#e securitizing discourse on drug tra!cking in the Philippines 
has been innovative in comparison to other Southeast Asian countries. 
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National authorities in the region usually present an undi!erentiated 
category comprised of users, pushers, and mules, which account for 
most arrests, all assimilated under the label of “drug tra"cking” and 
targeted as parasites to the morals of the nation, a privileged referent 
object regularly linked to the state. But the Philippine government has 
developed an extensive plea for mercy focusing on mules as victims 
instead of mere culprits. #ey consequently introduced a new category 
of drug personalities that is still rarely used in other national discourses: 
“recruiters” (Lesaba 2011; Sauler 2012).
An extensive analysis of press reports dating back to 2003 shows 
that mules are usually identi$ed as “drug tra"ckers” by the authorities 
and the media of most countries, while the Philippines remain a 
noticeable exception. #e Philippine government and its agencies will 
use very di!erent quali$cations when speaking of drug mules, who 
are presented as “helpless individuals” in need of “rescue,” “migrant 
workers … falling prey to the lure of drug syndicates” that commit 
the “heinous crime” of recruitment (AIPA 2012, 2). #is construction 
of a fundamental dichotomy between drug tra"ckers (including 
recruiters) versus drug mules has no equivalent in other countries 
yet. National authorities of most Southeast Asian countries prefer to 
include mules in a wider “drug tra"ckers” category distinct from “the 
nation” as a traditional referent object, i.e., the target of the alleged 
security threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 21–22). While it still remains 
marginal in neighboring countries, in the Philippines, a particular 
subjectivity of the female drug mule as a “victim,” stressing out her 
need for protection from harm (Fleetwood and Haas 2011, 198), is 
prevalent in both discourse and practice.
#ere have been undeniable signs since 2010 that female drug 
mules convicted in foreign countries were worrying the Filipino 
authorities, who then began to stress the fact that such a tendency had 
been identi$ed as dating back to 2007 (GMA News 2011). #e PDEA 
indeed identi$ed the recruitment of drug mules for the $rst time in 
its 2008 annual report: “Recent developments revealed the increasing 
involvement of Filipinos as ‘mules’ in transporting illegal drugs abroad. 
#ese Filipino ‘mules’ are tightly monitored by the West African Drug 
Syndicates (WADS) during the drug run bound for China. #e mules 
usually get in contact with the WADS in exit points where they were 
given instructions. Meanwhile, the WADS escort the mules to facilitate 
entry to destination points. From 2001 to 2005, WADS employed male 
‘mules.’ However, the successive arrest of male mules … en route to the 
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!nal destination point, compelled the WADs to change gear and begin 
employing female mules” (PDEA 2008, 15). "is shift to female mules 
by the WADS, according to counter-tra#cking authorities, is linked 
both to a desire to avoid suspicion from the authorities, as local women 
allegedly attract less attention than their male counterparts, and the 
impression—shared by male o#cials—that they are both dispensable 
and more easily manipulated, especially when engaged in romantic 
relationships with drug tra#ckers. 
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, this mode of operation was not 
publicized in the media as a pattern until 2010. "e PDEA director-
general, Dionisio R. Santiago, declared in March 2010 that of the 
sixty-six nationals on death row in China at the time, !fty-three were 
women, and this information has been widely promoted by the media 
since (Segura 2010). Such considerations had led to the creation of a 
Drug Couriers Task Force under Arroyo’s presidency the month before 
to “prevent the further victimization of Filipinos by international 
drug syndicates” (Philippine Star 2011a). Press statements following 
the creation of such a mechanism focused on the necessity for the 
government to protect fellow countrymen (ibid.). Following the 
launch of this initiative, the Philippine Embassy in "ailand targeted 
West African drug syndicates as operating large-scale recruitment 
of Filipino women as mules (OFW News Worldwide 2010). But 
it is a speci!c case that permitted a rapid shift of the issue to top 
priority governmental concerns and contributed the widespread focus 
on women, with the approval of the public opinion. In 2011, three 
Filipino drug mules, including two women, who were facing death 
row in China for smuggling heroin in the country, attracted a wide 
movement of sympathy in the Philippines from civil society (Sun 
Star 2011). "ere was a widespread assumption in the country that 
Sally Ordinario-Villanueva, Ramon Credo, and Elizabeth Batain had 
been duped by transnational criminal syndicates. "e fact that they 
came from poor families was also emphasized regularly both by the 
media and government o#cials, especially President Benigno Aquino 
III, who repeatedly asked its Chinese counterparts for clemency. "e 
media covering of Sally Ordinario-Villanueva’s last moments with 
her relatives was especially emotional, stressing her responsibility as a 
mother and breadwinner for her poor family in addition to portraying 
her as a victim of manipulation (AFP 2011). "is contrasts heavily 
with the subjectivity employed by the media and the authorities to 
describe recruiters as in charge and immoral. It must also be noted that 
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press reports generally stress the fact that recruiters are predominantly 
male, but do not make a distinction when women are involved in 
recruitment, as was the alleged recruiter of Sally Ordinario-Villanueva, 
Tita Cacayan (Sauler 2012).
Socio-economic di!culties resulting from gendered dimensions 
of poverty, as well as coercion through interpersonal threat, are stated 
by research on drug mules as important factors explaining the active 
involvement of women in the drug trade (Fleetwood and Haas 2011, 
197). However, according to the United Nations (UN) Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs (2011), there is an important lack of data on the 
circumstances and consequences that lead women to getting involved 
in drug tra!cking, which renders the production of a comprehensive 
analysis on this quite di!cult. Some NGOs have been focusing on this 
question. Gabriela Women’s Party (2012), the party list of the feminist 
NGO network Gabriela, publicized conclusions of the PDEA and the 
Department of Foreign A"airs (DFA) about the rise in enrollment 
of female OFWs as drug mules in order to criticize governmental 
policies on labor export. However, o!cial reports in the Philippines 
and neighboring countries, when mentioning speci#c circumstances, 
typically point to super#cial speculations, are way more interested in 
focusing on the role of TCOs, and usually deprive women of agency in 
their own involvement. Philippine authorities are targeting recruiters, 
and failing to implement e"ective pre-emptive socio-economic 
measures to reduce women’s incentives to work as drug mules in a 
situation of crisis and debt.
In February 2011, the Department of Justice, acting on behalf 
of President Benigno Aquino III, ordered the National Bureau of 
Investigation (NBI) to reinforce its commitment to rid the country 
of criminal syndicates recruiting OFWs as drug mules. In subsequent 
declarations, government representatives made a clear link between 
the activities of so-called “WADS,” especially Nigerian nationals, and 
the recruitment of women as drug mules (Inquirer 2011). A national 
PR campaign was also launched by the PDEA and the Philippine 
Information Agency to warn against the consequences of being recruited 
as a drug courier. $e posters stating “Don’t even think about it!” showing 
a black silhouette carrying drugs in its stomach did not target women 
especially. $e link was made through o!cial statements surrounding the 
campaign, speci#cally focused on the di!cult socio-economic conditions 
of Filipinas unable to #nd jobs as maids in a time of economic recession 
as the main explanation for an alleged rise in convictions of drug mules. 
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Figure 2. Anti-drug couriers PR campaign (Anti-Drug Courier Drive 2013).
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One of these statements came from Ed Malaya, then 
spokesperson of the DFA, and it perfectly sums up the securitization 
process going on: “there appears to be a speci!c targeting of our 
Filipina women by international drug syndicates to be used as drug 
mules” (Elona 20 11). It is particularly interesting that women are 
often perceived as victims of manipulation by recruiters, lured into 
marrying men that then either conceal drugs into their luggage 
without them knowing, or pressure them into voluntarily carrying 
drugs (Lesaba 2011). A couple of months after the DFA, Jose 
Gutierrez Jr., director of the PDEA, issued the following statement: 
“"e series of arrest of female drug personalities, both local and 
foreign nationals, indicates that the illegal drug trade is no longer 
a man’s world. . . . Because women are less prone to suspicion 
by law enforcers, drug syndicates have exploited this inherent 
characteristic” (Elona 2011).
"e most evident manifestations of the securitization process, 
as stated before, immediately followed the execution of alleged drug 
mules Sally Ordinario-Villanueva, Elizabeth Batain, and Ramos 
Credo in China on March 30th, 2011 (AFP 2011). President Aquino 
declared countering drug tra#cking a top priority amidst the surge in 
the recruitment of OFWs as drug mules (Avendaño 2011; Philippine 
Star 2011d). At the beginning of April 2011, the DFA pleaded for 
the launch of an all-out war on “international drug syndicates, which 
have increasingly victimized Filipinos as drug couriers” (Philippine 
Star 2011c). According to these statements, the PDEA ought to be in 
charge of leading a coalition of national agencies including the Bureau 
of Immigration, the national police, the Bureau of Customs, and the 
NBI (ibid.).
A year later, the recruitment of drug mules is still stated as a top 
priority by the PDEA and serves to justify calls for greater budgets 
and extraordinary measures. "e most recent example of this is a 
statement issued by PDEA director-general Jose S. Gutierrez Jr. 
seeking an amendment of the anti-wiretapping law, Republic Act no. 
4200, in order to include drug tra#cking in the list of crimes for which 
wiretapping may be allowed, with the objective to trace alleged ring 
leaders (Yap 2012). "e PDEA uses the 2011 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report to stress the necessity to remedy the lack of 
resources allowed to counter-tra#cking agencies in the Philippines. 
More recently, the AIPA (2012) reported that “restrictive laws that 
prevent law enforcers from identifying the drug kingpins” were one of 
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the main “stumbling blocks in its anti-drug campaign,” and called for 
the removal of “the !nancial constraints to wage an all out war against 
drug tra"ckers.”
#e focus on drug mules by the authorities must be seen as part of 
a general tendency to target the activities of TCOs from outside the 
region since the end of the 1990s (PDEA 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). As 
explained before, drug tra"cking in the Philippines is viewed as being 
embedded in regional networks whose main players are transnational 
organizations from China, Iran and West Africa, to which local groups 
are linked. But the alliances between TCOs and local clans or so-called 
“drug lords” are typically ad hoc, very $uid and di"cult to ascertain 
(Dupont 2001), so one must be extremely cautious with sensationalist 
statements that describe transnational organized crime as a hierarchy 
of more or less important individuals and groups. Moreover, while 
extensive research on bossism in the Philippines suggests that local 
clans are implicated in drug tra"cking among other criminal activities 
(McCoy 2009, xix; Sidel 1999, 135–36), these links are excluded from 
the o"cial securitization process, which targets the role of transnational 
networks. An exception remains with insurrectionist groups from the 
southern Philippines, who are targeted by the PDEA and the media 
as important actors in crystal-methamphetamine tra"cking and other 
substances (GMA News 2006; Philippine Star 2002).
Chinese syndicates from Hong-Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC 
have been singled out by Filipino agencies as the main players in 
drug tra"cking within and outside the country. #e authorities have 
increasingly reported alleged links with the Chinese diaspora and 
local criminal groups. According to the PDEA, drug production in 
the Philippines is mainly destined to the Chinese market, including 
Taiwan (Segura 2010). #is clashes with numerous reports of local use, 
a wide range of intra-regional destination countries and the targeting 
of Filipino market by transnational groups from Iran and West Africa 
operating in Southeast Asia. Reports show that the use of local women 
as drug mules is more common in transit operations involving West 
African networks, whereas Iranian syndicates tend to rely more on 
Iranian nationals, both men and women alike. #ere have not been 
as many speci!c reports incriminating Chinese syndicates of using 
women as mules, but they are still targeted as such at least since March 
2010, when statements from the PDEA linked the recruitment of 
mules to carry drugs to China with the operations of “Ethnic-Chinese” 
gangs. #e PDEA director-general of the time, Dionisio R. Santiago, 
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then stated, “In terms of drug tra!cking, the Chinese are everywhere,” 
explaining that the Philippines had become a regional hub for 
syndicates originating from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, as well as 
the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. "e launch 
of a national campaign to counter the recruitment of Filipino mules 
in April 2011 served as a justi#cation for the simultaneous imposition 
of tighter guidelines by the Bureau of Immigration on the entry of 
Chinese and West African nationals, especially Nigerians (Philippine 
Star 2011b). 
A number of press articles by Filipino media have reported arrests 
and seizures of shabu involving local drug “lords,” “kingpins,” and 
“bosses,” but we must be careful with the use of such quali#cations 
because they are eminently arbitrary and unreliable, especially when 
they come from counter-tra!cking agencies facing suspicions of 
corruption and trying to justify their relevance through quotas. "ese 
articles rely on sensationalist information about speci#c localities, and 
rarely, if ever, make links with the global picture of drug tra!cking 
in the Philippines in comparison to reports on TCOs. While they 
provide some information on the modalities of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny, they are therefore situated outside the discourse we 
are interested in. With the fragmentation of drug tra!cking in recent 
years, it is especially challenging to distinguish scapegoats from 
genuine drug kingpins, who are most likely well protected by intricate 
links of patronage and corruption with the authorities (Sidel 1999; 
McCoy 2009). "orough research on speci#c patterns of the informal 
economy in the Philippines since the end of the 1990s is needed, if we 
are to better understand the reasons why local clans are generally left 
out of the securitization process on drug tra!cking. 
A notable exception to this pattern is the denunciation by the 
authorities of the role of rebel organizations and ethnic-minority 
groups in cross-border criminal activities and drug tra!cking as an 
endemic phenomenon in peripheral regions, a focus that has served as 
a justi#cation for numerous wars on drugs and other law enforcement 
campaigns. "is has been the case in the Philippines (Dupont 
2001, 183, 201; Dick 2005, 271), where Abu Sayyaf and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are targeted by national authorities 
implicated in drug tra!cking (BINLEA 2009, 92; UNODC 2009, 
183),5 but also in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, "ailand, and 
Vietnam.
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A REGIONAL DISCOURSE ON DRUG TRAFFICKING: 
PROSPECTS FOR MULTILATERALISM
!e process underway in the Philippines presents a number of 
similarities with how drug tra"cking is being presented by national 
authorities from neighboring countries. While the victimization of 
drug mules has been a central feature of counter-tra"cking operations 
in the Philippines, a similar focus is also increasingly common in other 
Southeast Asian countries, notably in Malaysia, Indonesia, and !ailand. 
Whereas the so-called “CLMV” block (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam) continues to include mules in the hold-all category of 
“drug tra"ckers,” the discourse taking place in the Philippines seems 
to have counterparts in neighboring countries, where the victimization 
of female drug mules is accompanying the implementation of counter-
tra"cking initiatives both at the national and sub-regional levels. !is 
trend is consistent with an overarching securitization process situated 
on a regional scale, according to which drug tra"cking is framed as a 
foreign predation that is becoming prevalent throughout Southeast 
Asia, which can be conceived as a “security constellation” (Buzan 
and Wæver 2009, 256). It is representative not only of widespread 
but independent national security concerns, but also of ASEAN’s 
increasing e#orts to target transnational security issues since the 
middle of the 1990s.
THE VICTIMIZATION OF DRUG MULES IN 
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Indonesia shares with the Philippines its concern over the recruitment 
of women as mules by WADS. Numerous press reports in 2011 stress 
that both Indonesian and Filipino women are operating as couriers 
within Indonesian territory. A particular case attracted attention from 
the media in 2011: Custom o"cers arrested a pregnant woman at 
Bali Ngurah Rai International Airport for “allegedly attempting to 
smuggle 324 grams of crystal-methamphetamine by swallowing it.” 
Indonesian authorities declared that it was a new mode of operation, 
because until then pregnant women were less likely to be subjected to 
X-ray scans (Erviani 2011). But the recruitment of female drug mules 
has been the focus of media coverage earlier than that. In June 2010, 
the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) launched a program to prevent 
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Indonesian women from enrollment as drug couriers. !e chief of the 
agency, Gories Mere, stated that “drug syndicates use women couriers 
because it is easier for women to get through entry points,” and that 
their numbers had increased since 2008. While stressing that, as in 
the Philippines, women were lured by marriage proposals from drug 
dealers posing as potential husbands who then pressured them into 
acting as mules, the emphasis on victimization is less evident than in 
the Philippines. !e BNN explains the phenomenon mainly by a lack 
of education and awareness by women of the consequences of drug 
tra"cking (Jakarta Post 2010). In August 2010, the Ministry of Labor 
manifested its concern over the situation of Indonesian drug mules 
facing death row in Malaysia (Kompas 2010).
Malaysian authorities began to emphasize the recruitment 
of Malaysian women as drug mules as a pattern for international 
drug syndicates in April 2011, about the same time the similar 
securitization process culminated in the Philippines. Public opinion 
movements of sympathy over drug mules arose with the case of Yong 
Vui Kong, a Malaysian national facing death row in Singapore in 2011. 
Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign A#airs repeatedly declared 
in April 2011 that the recruitment of single mothers and female 
university students by drug tra"cking syndicates, especially from West 
Africa, through social networks on the Internet, was becoming more 
common (New Straits Times 2011a, 2011c). WADS’ recruitment of 
local drug mules was the subject of calls in 2012 for the enhancement 
of interstate cooperation between the Malaysian authorities and their 
counterparts in neighboring countries (New Straits Times 2012a). 
However, as is the case in Indonesia, women tend to be less victimized 
by the authorities who repeatedly express suspicions over pleas that 
they did not know they were carrying drugs. At a press conference 
in December 2011, Narcotics Criminal Investigation Department 
director, Datuk Mohd Noor Rashid Ibrahim, declared that “the lure 
of money and luxurious lifestyle promised by syndicates were among 
the factors women in the country were willing to become drug mules.” 
In a more recent declaration, the Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
customs director Datuk M. Govinden stated that there had been an 
increase in the number of local women convicted for carrying drugs 
in 2011. According to him, drug syndicates used local women from 
age 19 to 20, and lured them with expensive goods (New Straits Times 
2012b). In general, Malaysian authorities seem to be convinced that 
the women caught carrying drugs were perfectly aware of doing so and 
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were driven by greed (New Straits Times 2011b). Despite the public 
sympathy that such cases sometimes attract, the director of the Federal 
Narcotics Department made that point very clear in an interview in 
February 2012 (Ramli 2012). 2012 witnessed an increasing number 
of statements by the authorities stressing recruitment of female 
drug mules by WADS as the most recent mode of operation of drug 
tra!ckers in the country (Shi-Ian 2012).
"ailand is probably the country where the discourse on women 
drug mules is the most similar to that of the Philippines. In February 
2011, counter-tra!cking agencies began to express particular concern 
over WADS recruiting "ai women as drug mules. "e director of 
the Narcotics Suppression Bureau, Atithep Panjamanond, reported 
numerous cases of African men “tricking” "ai women into marrying 
them and then manipulating them in carrying drugs. "e discourse 
focuses on the di!cult socio-economic conditions of the women 
recruited and serves as a justi#cation for the reinforcement of custom 
regulations over the entry of individuals from West African countries 
(Bangkok Post 2011). What is particularly interesting in such reports 
is that while the press coverage of drug mules arrests is extremely 
important in "ailand, only cases of "ai women targeted by male 
West African tra!ckers have been identi#ed as a pattern, and used 
as a pretext for generalizations over the wider issue of drug tra!cking 
between 2009 and 2012. "ese considerations have led Filipino 
and "ai authorities to reach an agreement on the reinforcement of 
bilateral information sharing to stop international drug syndicates 
from recruiting drug couriers in the two countries (Lee-Brago 2011). 
"e recruitment of local women as drug mules by transnational 
syndicates has been a focus of a wider securitization process common 
to most, if not all, components of the region. "is focus was more 
recurrent in the Philippines, where national authorities have also 
stressed a particular dimension of the problem: the victimization of 
recruited women, with an emphasis on the di!cult socio-economic 
conditions they face. "e Philippines singled out drug mules not as 
representatives of the threat itself, but as part of the threatened. "is 
is indeed part of a regional tendency to frame drug tra!cking as an 
external threat, while insiders that could be assimilated to that threat 
are either ignored in the discourse, de#ned as outsiders, or included on 
the victim side when possible.
In other countries facing a similar phenomenon, most notably 
Malaysia and Indonesia, national authorities express suspicions and 
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stress the pursuit of luxury as the main motive of women enrolled 
as drug mules. But a discourse very similar to that of the Philippines 
emerged simultaneously in !ailand, albeit in a more limited fashion. 
!is has led both countries to improve bilateral arrangements based 
on the perception of common interests. !is development is far from 
anecdotal and indicates that the harmonisation of security discourses 
supplemented by national counter-tra"cking initiatives compatible 
across countries may lead to increasing cooperation.
DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN PREDATION: 
A WIDER SECURITIZATION PROCESS
We have now established that the victimization of female drug 
mules by transnational criminal networks has increasingly attracted 
the attention of national authorities both in the Philippines and 
neighboring countries. We now turn to an assessment of how this 
tendency is linked to other elements characterizing the way national 
governments in the region frame drug tra"cking,
As indicated above, the general orientation of the securitization 
process is to present drug tra"cking as an external predation. !e 
recruitment of women as drug mules is singled out as the main 
problem associated with the presence of TCOs from non-ASEAN 
countries, mainly China, Iran, and Nigeria. !is trend is arguably the 
main feature of the o"cial discourse on drug tra"cking taking place 
in the region, but it is complemented with two additional elements: 
the imputed responsibility of ethno-cultural minorities, and the 
concern that drug tra"cking serves as an important component of the 
funding of secessionist insurrections. !e distinction between “Self ” 
and “Other” is prevalent in every one of these three elements, and the 
threat is understood as primarily targeting national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity while including a connotation about identity. 
Drug Trafficking as a Source of 
Funding for Insurrectionist Groups
!e ongoing presence of insurrectionist groups in Aceh (Indonesia), 
Southern !ailand, and Mindanao (Philippines) has shaped the o"cial 
discourse on drug tra"cking as well as counter-tra"cking measures. 
32 Social Transformations Vol. 1, No. 2, Aug. 2013
Again, the focus on links between organized crime and armed 
insurrections in the margins of these countries by national authorities 
is linked to facilitating conditions. It has been emphasized by scholars 
that the presence of drug production sites increases the duration of 
con!icts (Cornell 2005, 753; Ross 2005, 53) and that, in Southeast 
Asia especially, “drug tra"ckers are [increasingly] allying themselves 
with separatist . . . groups, serving as ‘cash cows’ in return for protection 
and access to paramilitary resources. In some cases, the drug tra"ckers 
and insurgents are one and the same” (Dupont 2001, 194). Moreover, 
an extensive literature on the “crime-terror nexus” has shown that 
terrorist groups tend to rely on drug tra"cking, among other illicit 
activities, to #nance their operations (Makarenko 2004). Accordingly, 
terrorism and organized crime have been regularly amalgamated under 
the broad category of “transnational crimes” by ASEAN since 1997 
(Haacke and Williams 2008, 795–99). Governmental agencies from 
$ailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines have put these considerations 
at the forefront of their o"cial discourse on drug tra"cking, applying 
them to the groups operating on their respective national territories.
Drug tra"cking and organized crime is endemic in Southern 
$ailand, where control by the national government is considerably 
limited by the presence of secessionist groups, especially in the three 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Since 2001, when $aksin 
Shinawatra came into power, the $ai government has made a point 
to focus on drug tra"cking activities by the insurgents while playing 
down their political motivations (Liow and Pathan 2009, 4). $is 
has led the authorities to include national security issues speci#c to 
the South under nation-wide concerns about organized crime and 
related counter-tra"cking initiatives, notably the especially violent 
2003 “war on drugs,” during which 2,500 were killed, including a 
wide proportion of innocents (!e Nation 2007). More recently, high 
representatives of the military and police units in charge of security 
in the South released common statements about their suspicions that 
Muslim secessionist groups and drug tra"ckers have increased the 
level of their collaboration. O"cials have expressed speci#c concerns 
about the systematic targeting of policemen by armed insurgents since 
February 2011, which was perceived as the undeniable sign that drug 
kingpins with access to sophisticated information on the whereabouts 
of policemen were implicated. According to them, the most plausible 
explanation was that a pact had been contracted to ensure that in 
exchange for information and funding by drug tra"ckers, the insurgents 
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would aim at strategic targets linked to counter-tra!cking operations 
instead of random ones. However, while government representatives 
claim that these links have been long known, no indication of the sort 
has yet been con"rmed by the independent experts interviewed apart 
from the fact that the respective spheres of activity of each group are 
di!cult to distinguish in such a context.
Indonesian media have repeatedly reported that drug tra!cking 
is endemic in Aceh, systematically linking such information with 
the ongoing political instability in the area. #e police have recently 
renewed concerns about the links of remnant Acehnese militants with 
the Jeemah Islamiyah ( JI), a terrorist organization allegedly responsible 
for the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005 (Hasan 2010). According to 
information issued by Indonesia authorities, the JI is implicated in 
extensive drug tra!cking operations (Praginanto 2009; Saragih 2011).
#e Philippines is probably the country where o!cial concerns 
about the links between organized crime and terrorism are the most 
explicit. As noted above, the Philippine government and international 
counter-tra!cking agencies agree that Abu Sayyaf and the MILF 
were using shabu as one of their primary sources of funding (UNODC 
2009, 183; BINLEA 2009, 92).6 #e BINLEA of the US Department 
of State, relying on information provided by national counter-
tra!cking agencies in the Philippines, reported in 2009 that drug 
tra!ckers a!liated with Abu Sayyaf were the main providers of 
methamphetamine within the country and have developed extended 
links throughout the region. According to the same report, Abu 
Sayyaf is also implicated in providing protection to manufacture sites 
(BINLEA 2009, 92).
Ethno-Cultural Minorities and the Distribution 
of Narcotics: The Case of Thailand
#e distinction between insiders and outsiders is typical of every 
national discourse on drug tra!cking in the region. It has already been 
noted that o!cials in the Philippines expressed numerous concerns 
about the implication of people from Mindanao in the drug trade, 
and that there was a recurrent ambivalence in o!cial statements about 
the implications of “Ethnic-Chinese” groups as well, often without 
further distinction between Chinese nationals and individuals from 
the diaspora. In Indonesia, an editorial has recently issued a call 
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to the nation to combat “a massive invasion of drugs,” focusing on 
the culpability of individuals of foreign origin (Jakarta Post 2011). 
Nevertheless, the country where the speci!c targeting of minority 
groups as implicated in drug tra"cking is the most extensive among 
those under study remains, undoubtedly, #ailand. 
Calls to the nation were a main characteristic of #aksin 
Shinawatra’s o"cial declarations during the 2003 war on drugs, during 
which the targeting of minority groups from the North was especially 
important. #e wide perception of yao and h’mong populations as 
responsible for social evils associated with drugs dates back to the 
1970s and the prime of the heroin trade from the Golden Triangle 
(Lyttleton 2004, 914). Drug dependence among such groups has also 
been the focus of numerous articles during the 1990s, being interpreted 
by the media as the symptom of a great shock that the hill tribes were 
supposedly facing in the context of rapid economic development and 
social progress (Bangkok Post 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996; !e Nation 
1993). #is depiction is reminiscent today with the di$erence that 
#ai authorities now target minority groups as active participants in 
the distribution of synthetic drugs from the Golden Triangle (Bangkok 
Post 2010), as was explicitly expressed during interviews conducted 
in April 2011 with high representatives of the O"ce of Narcotics 
Control Board.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERSTATE 
RELATIONS WITHIN ASEAN
#e previous section has emphasized the linkages between di$erent 
aspects of a wider securitization process of drug tra"cking focusing 
on the responsibility of outsiders in the drug trade. #e recruitment 
of female drug mules by TCOs and the associated focus by national 
authorities from the Philippines, #ailand, and Indonesia can be 
interpreted as part of a coherent representation of drug tra"cking as 
a foreign predation. #is also has implications for interstate relations 
within the region. #e focus on TCOs, minorities, and insurgents 
has been the pretext for improving the range of counter-tra"cking 
initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, among ASEAN countries, 
while avoiding putting the blame on fellow member states. #e 
authorities not only focused on the presence of Chinese, Iranian, 
and West-African TCOs in the region, but have also been especially 
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careful, when the responsibility of another member state could not 
be ignored, to avoid speci!cs while preferring vague references to 
a “neighboring country.” "is deliberate vagueness is in line with 
diplomatic norms characteristic of the so-called “ASEAN way,” and is 
perfectly compatible with the progress of cooperation on such issues. It 
has allowed a continued participation of member states’ representatives 
in speci!c meetings and working groups on transnational crime. 
Moreover, counter-tra#cking mechanisms have also been 
increasingly formalized over the years. In particular, a review of reports 
by the Dialogue and Research Monitor (2003, 2007, 2008) shows 
that while tra#cking in synthetic drugs was becoming an increasingly 
alarming trend for national authorities in most of Southeast Asian 
countries, transnational organized crime was simultaneously moved 
from informal to formal discussions at the regional level. "e 2007 
report states, “It appears that there are regional mechanisms in place 
that are moving forward steadily to address these issues, such as … 
the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to 
Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), the meetings of the ASEAN Senior 
O#cials on Drugs, and the Senior O#cials Meeting on Transnational 
Crime and its working group on narcotics” (Dialogue and Research 
Monitor 2007). ASEAN Senior O#cial on Drugs (ASOD) 2009–
2015 Action Plan currently de!nes regional cooperation against drug 
tra#cking. "is initiative represents an incremental process dating 
back to 1972, when heroin production peaked in the Golden Triangle 
(Emmers 2006, 9). Since the inclusion of Myanmar by ASEAN 
in 1995, the depth of relevant mechanisms and the pace by which 
regional initiatives are implemented have steadily increased (Emmers 
2006, 16; Haacke 2009, 429; ASEAN 1997). "e Plan of Action for 
a Drug-Free ASEAN in 2015 (ASEAN 2000) and the Declaration 
on ASEAN Concord II (ASEAN Secretariat 2009) include explicit 
commitments to multilateral cooperation against transnational crime.
Recent developments in the illicit drug trade, among other non-
traditional issues, have made governments traditionally reticent to 
multilateralism realize the necessity to increase cooperation with each 
other to face transnational security challenges. Further research is 
needed to reach a comprehensive understanding of the implications 
on regional cooperation of national authorities in Southeast Asia 
harmonizing their security policies around common interests. 
Systematic evaluation of the impact of non-state actors, especially 
epistemic communities, in shaping the agenda of interstate security 
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cooperation against non-traditional issues, would be especially 
interesting. Security cooperation in Southeast Asia has been based on 
the growing perception of shared interests against common threats 
and may as well contribute to the formation of a regional identity 
among elites (Acharya 2009; Busse 1998). It remains to be seen if, 
and in what measure, such perception can help sustain the progress of 
regional integration in the following years.
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that a particular securitization process is taking 
place in the Philippines with regard to drug tra!cking. "e o!cial 
discourse currently focuses on the recruitment of female drug mules 
by transnational criminal organizations. While this tendency is now 
shared by a growing number of states in Southeast Asia, the Philippine 
authorities have adopted a particular subjectivity of the women involved 
as victims, stressing the need for the government to protect them. "is 
has led the authorities to add a sub-category to the encapsulating 
“drug tra!ckers,” “recruiters.” Accordingly, speci#c measures were 
implemented that target the enrollment of female drug mules by 
TCOs. "is distinction has not yet appeared in neighboring countries, 
but there are increasing signs that point to a gradual harmonization of 
the framing of drug tra!cking at the regional level, which guides the 
implementation of an increasing number of agreements, mechanisms, 
and practices of regional cooperation.
As Southeast Asia has been particularly a$ected by the rise of 
transnational organized crime after the end of the Cold War, the 
securitization framework developed is useful to understand how 
national authorities have been framing this issue as a security threat. "e 
framing of drug tra!cking in the Philippines has proved an especially 
interesting case study in this matter. Nonetheless, is also contributes to 
reinforce the relevance of a reformulation of securitization as a process 
instead of an endpoint, especially to increase its application to non-
Western contexts.
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NOTES
1 The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of the following 
individuals to the development of this paper: two anonymous reviewers, Steffen 
Jenson, Dominique Caouette, Julien Vallée, Clara Boulianne-Lagacé, Adrien 
Vallat, Béatrice Rea, Anne-Lise Sauterey, François Guillemot, and Eric Frécon. 
 
The author would also like to acknowledge the support of the following organizations: 
the Observatory of Illicit Trafficking, the Research Institute on Contemporary 
Southeast Asia (IRASEC), the Institute of East Asian Studies (Université Lyon 2/ENS 
Lyon), and the Department of Political Science and the East Asian Studies Centre 
(University of Montreal).
2 While the securitization framework elaborated by the Copenhagen School focuses 
on the importance of the “speech act” by securitizing actors, we prefer the use 
of “securitizing move,” which implies a broader definition of what constitutes 
discourse, including different types of political communication.
3 It is important to note that the recruitment of drug mules has recently reached 
a level of global concern, as the UNODC briefly reported in its 2011 World Drug 
Report, but with no mention of women being especially targeted (UNODC 2011b). 
Still, the adoption of the UN Resolution 52/1 “Promoting international cooperation 
in addressing the involvement of women and girls in drug trafficking, especially as 
couriers” and the subsequent report (UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2009, 2011) 
points out to a global securitization process that is linked to the growing presence 
of West African Drug Syndicates (WADS) and their prominent use of drug couriers, 
and is clearly informed by reports at the regional level of East and Southeast Asia 
(UNODC 2011a, 166). The global reach of the securitization process under scrutiny 
will not be the subject of this paper as it is only beginning to take place.
4 Interviews of drug mules and traffickers have not yet been conducted successfully 
by the author due to access limitations to potential interviewees, so the focus of the 
present article is on the framing of the issue by the authorities (and the media) and 
their interpretation of the motivations of individuals and groups implicated in the 
drug trade, complemented by insights from independent research on drug mules. 
5 Among other articles, see Philippine Star 2002 and GMA News 2006.
6 Also see GMA News 2006 and Philippine Star 2002.
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